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CRIMINAL LAW-WHEN BAD IS BAD:
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING ARGUMENTS
United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996)
I. FACTS
Defendants Keith Cannon and Stephanie Cannon sold cocaine base
to undercover officer Charles Sherbrooke on four separate occasions.1
The first transaction was recorded on audio tape, and the other three
transactions were videotaped. 2
The first transaction occurred in Alexandria, Minnesota. 3 The
defendants sold Sherbrooke cocaine base and told him that they were
interested in buying guns.4 Arrangements were made to meet again in
Alexandria within a week for another drug transaction. 5
During the second transaction, the defendants sold Sherbrooke
more cocaine base.6 Sherbrooke asked whether the defendants still
wanted to buy guns, and the defendants said yes. 7 Sherbrooke said his
supplier could provide the firearms and offered to get anything else the
defendants wanted. 8 He also explained that the firearms transaction
would have to take place in North Dakota because his supplier had an
arrest warrant out on him in Minnesota. 9
Two days later, the parties met for the third transaction in Alex-
andria.10 Again, Sherbrooke purchased cocaine base from the de-
fendants."I After the sale, the conversation immediately turned to the
plans for the next transaction.12 Stephanie said she was interested in
acquiring five handguns, and Sherbrooke responded that his supplier
1. United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1499 (8th Cir. 1996). Agent Sherbrooke was an agent
of the West Central Minnesota Drug Task Force. Id.
2. Id. At trial, the audio tape and video tape of the transactions were entered into evidence.
Appellant's Brief at 5-6, United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-1997).
3. Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1499. The defendants were introduced to Sherbrooke by a confidential
informant on September 14, 1994. Brief for Appellee/Cross Appellant at 2, Cannon (No.
95-1996NDF).
4. Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1499.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. The defendants specified that they wanted two .38 caliber snub-nosed revolvers, two der-
ringers, and one .25 caliber automatic pistol. Id. When Sherbrooke joked about their reasons for
wanting the weapons, the defendants said they were "'desperate' because they had drugs stolen from
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could get the handguns and anything else she wanted. 13 Keith offered to
trade the cocaine base for the guns.14 After the discussion, the parties
agreed to meet the following week in Fargo, North Dakota.15
The fourth and final transaction occurred in a Fargo motel. 16
Special Agent John Keating posed as Sherbrooke's supplier.17 The
parties were introduced and made small talk for a few minutes, then dis-
cussed the terms of sale for the cocaine base the defendants had
brought.l8 Keating opened his bag and produced ten firearms of vary-
ing design.19 The defendants inspected the guns, and some discussion
about the weapons followed. 20 The defendants eventually selected three
of the handguns. 21
After more discussion, Sherbrooke asked if the defendants wanted
any of the remaining guns.22 Keith said no, but that he would want to
purchase an "Uzi or some type of automatic weapon" later. 23 Keith
explained the dangers of street business, and said he wanted a machine
gun with fifty rounds for protection. 24 He wanted to purchase such a
gun at the next meeting.25
At this point, Sherbrooke asked Keating whether the machine guns
would be available for sale in the future. 26 Keating replied that he ex-
pected to sell them to another buyer if the defendants did not purchase
them. 27 Keith repeated that he wanted to buy a machine gun at the next
meeting.2 8 Stephanie then asked if drugs could be traded for a machine
gun. 29 After some negotiating, three ounces of cocaine base were traded
for three handguns, a MAC-type .380 caliber machine gun, and $4,600
13. Id. Three times during the transaction Sherbrooke stated that defendants would have a




17. Id. Keating was an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1500. As Keating described the larger of the two machine guns, referring to it as being
capable of holding thirty rounds, Sherbrooke called it a "neat item." Id.
20. Id. During this time, the defendants were served alcohol by the undercover officers.
Appellant's Brief at 9, Cannon (No. 96-1997).
21. Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1500.
22. Id.









in cash. 30 After the exchange, the defendants left and were arrested by
law enforcement officials waiting outside.31
The defendants were charged in a nine-count indictment. 32 At trial,
the prosecutor referred to the defendants as "bad people" during his
closing argument.33 The defense counsel objected to this as an improper
reference to the defendants' character. 34 The district court overruled,
stating that closing arguments can be argumentative. 35 The prosecutor
then continued by saying, "[T]here are bad people in the world, ladies
and gentlemen. We are lucky where we live not to come in contact with
as many as there may be in other parts of the country. But there are still
some around here." 36
The jury found the defendants guilty of all counts, rejecting the
defendants' entrapment defense. 37 The defendants appealed their
convictions and sentences on several grounds, and the government
cross-appealed the sentences. 38
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor's
referral to the defendants during closing arguments as "bad people"
constituted prosecutorial misconduct. 39 The court reversed the convic-
tions and remanded on all counts. 40 The government's petition for a
rehearing was also denied.4 1
The scope of this case comment is limited to the Eighth Circuit's
holding of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. The court
gave an advisory opinion concerning the other issues brought up on
appeal by the defendants, including artificially created venue and change
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The court rejected the defendants' pre-trial motion to dismiss. Defendants based their
motion on a violation of the defendants' due process rights by artificially creating venue in the District
of North Dakota. Id. at 1501. The defendants' motion for transfer of venue was also denied. Id. The
defendants then moved to dismiss the counts relating to receiving and possessing the machine gun on
the grounds of due process and entrapment as a matter of law. Id. The district judge also denied this
motion. Id. at 1501.




37. Id. at 1500. The defendants raised the entrapment defense again in a post-trial motion. Id. at
1501. The district judge denied the motion and held that as a matter of law the defendants were not
entrapped. Id. At sentencing, the court did find that the government had employed sentencing entrap-
ment and sentencing manipulation, and did not impose the mandatory, consecutive 30 year sentence
for knowingly using and carrying a machine gun during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1503.
40. Id.
41. Telephone interview with Gene Doeling, attorney for Stephanie Cannon on appeal (Oct.
1996).
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of venue motions and due process claims; 42 challenges to Rule 21 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; 43 admission of evidence;44 rule of
lenity; 45 entrapment; 46 the outrageous government conduct defense; 47
jury instructions on entrapment;48 and Commerce Clause questions.49
42. See Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1501. The defendants, African-Americans, claimed that the govern-
ment attempted to create venue by crossing the state line into North Dakota, which has a lower
minority population than Minnesota. Id. The court found no evidentiary support and ruled that the
variance in minority population from Minnesota (2.17%) to North Dakota (.6%) was not sufficient to
support an allegation of outrageous government conduct which violated their due process rights. Id.
43. Id. The defendants claimed the court abused its discretion by denying their motion for
change of venue. Id. The Eighth Circuit found no evidentiary support for the motions and therefore
found no abuse of discretion by the district court. Id. at 1502.
44. Id. at 1503. The defendants claimed the cocaine base was improperly admitted as evidence
because the government failed to prove a proper chain of custody. Id. The Cannon court found the
evidence properly admitted, stating that the district court operates under a "presumption of integrity
for the physical evidence" if no showing of tampering, bad faith, or ill will is made by the defendant.
Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 994 F.2d 441, 443 (8th Cir. 1993)). The defendants failed to rebut
the presumption of integrity, so the evidence was properly admitted. Id.
45. Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1503-04. The defendants claimed the harsher statutory sentence for
cocaine base should be ignored under the rule of lenity because cocaine and cocaine base are
basically the same. Id. at 1504. The Eighth Circuit observed the repeated rejection of challenges to
penalties based on the distinction between cocaine and cocaine base, and said that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by not applying the rule of lenity. Id.
46. Id. The defendants claimed they were entrapped by the law enforcement officials. The
defendants had the burden of showing some evidence that the government officials implanted the
"criminal design" in their minds and induced them to commit the crime. Id. (citing United States v.
Eldeeb, 20 F.3d 841, 843 (8th Cir. 1994)). The government then has the duty to show the defendant
was predisposed to commit the crime. Id. (citing Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 58, 63 (1988)).
The Cannon court found the evidence overwhelming as to the drug charges based upon the
defendants' own statements about being robbed of sizable quantities of drugs in the past. Id. at 1505.
The court also found the defendants were predisposed to purchase handguns, based upon their interest
in acquiring firearms, the specificity of the request, as well as the fact that they drove to North Dakota
for the purpose of purchasing handguns in conjunction with a drug transaction. Id. Finally, the Court
found that a reasonable jury could have found the defendants were predisposed to buy a machine gun
based upon the circumstantial evidence presented. Id. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in not finding entrapment as a matter of law. Id.
47. Id. at 1506. The defendants claimed that the officers selling a machine gun to them was
outrageous conduct aimed solely at increasing their sentence. Id. A 30 year mandatory consecutive
sentence exists for using or carrying a machine gun in relation to a crime of drug trafficking, while a
five year sentence exists for handguns. Id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994)). The defendants
claimed that the government conduct (selling the machine gun to increase their sentences) was
outrageous conduct. Id. In order for government conduct to be outrageous, it must "shock the
conscience of the court." Id. (quoting United States v. Jensen, 69 F.3d 960, 911 (8th Cir. 1995)). The
Cannon court found that the conduct of the government officers did not shock the court. The court
considered the individual actions of the officers (offering a selection of firearms other than the type
the defendants had requested and informing defendants that several varieties of firearms would be
brought to the transaction for the defendants to select from) in making its decision. Id. at 1507.
Coupled with the defendants' statements about protecting their business and the magazine size
requested, the court concluded that the officers did not act outrageously when they offered or
described the weapons. Id.
48. Id. at 1508. The Cannon court disposed of the jury instruction challenge by stating that the
court has the liberty to choose whatever jury instruction it wishes as long as the law is accurately
stated, even if an instruction has been submitted by either party. Id. The court also held that the jury
instruction given regarding the definition of "use" was proper under the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the word. Id. at 1509.
49. Id. at 1510. The court, citing United States v. Brown, 72 F.3d 96 (8th Cir. 1995), summarily
dismissed the defendants' contention that Congress had exceeded its power under the Commerce
774
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II. LEGAL HISTORY
The history of prosecutorial misconduct spans several decades.
50
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the standard of conduct
for prosecutors during closing arguments in 1935.51 The Eighth Circuit
has expanded the Supreme Court's definition of what constitutes
prosecutorial misconduct, culminating in its decision in United States v.
Cannon .52
A. PROPRIETY OF PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS
The United States Supreme Court initially addressed prosecutorial
misconduct in 1935 in Berger v. United States.53 In Berger, the United
States Attorney engaged in improper cross-examination of witnesses and
misconduct during his argument to the jury. 54 The Court acknowledged
Clause when it enacted 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 924(c).
50. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (addressing for the first time the issue of
what constitutes prosecutorial misconduct); Thomas J. Oliver, Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to
What Courtroom Statements Made by Prosecuting Attorney During Criminal Trial Violate Due Process
or Constitute Denial of Fair Trial, 40 L. Ed. 2d 886 (1996) (giving extensive treatment of improper
prosecutorial behavior).
51. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 85.
52. 88 F.3d 1495 (1996).
53. 295 U.S. 78 (1935). The court found that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during cross
examination and closing argument when his argument to the jury was undignified, intemperate,
contained improper insinuations and assertions, and was calculated to mislead the jury. Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84 (1935).
54. See id. The court characterized the prosecutor as "conducting himself in a thoroughly
indecorous and improper manner." Id. The following excerpt is an example of the continuous
harassment of witnesses during the trial:
Q: Now Mr. Berger, do you remember yesterday when the court recessed for a few
minutes and you saw me out in the hall; do you remember that?
A: I do, Mr. Singer.
Q: You talked to me out in the hall?
A: I talked to you?
Q: Yes.
A: No.
Q: You say you didn't say to me out in the hall yesterday, 'You wait until I take the
stand and I will take care of you'? You didn't say that yesterday?
A: No; I didn't, Mr. Singer; you are lying.
Q: I am lying, you are right. You didn't say that at all?
A: No.
Q: You didn't speak to me out in the hall?
A: I never did speak to you outside since this case started, except the day I was in
your office, when you questioned me.
Q: I said yesterday.
A: No, Mr. Singer.
Q: Do you mean that seriously?
A: I said no.
Q: That never happened?
A: No, Mr. Singer, it did not.
Q: You did not say that to me?
A: Idid not.
Q: Of course, I have just made that up?
A: What do you want me to answer you?
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that the nature of the prosecutor's job is not to convict, but rather is to
serve justice.5 5 In so holding, the Supreme Court used language which
has become the landmark of prosecutorial duty:
[H]e may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to every legitimate means to bring about a
just one.56
The Court set the standard for appropriate and inappropriate
remarks made by the prosecutor with the Berger decision.5 7 It held that
an improper argument by the prosecutor may prejudice the jury and
result in a verdict not based upon the evidence. 58 Similarly, improper
suggestions, insinuations, and assertions of personal knowledge by the
prosecutor were also clearly rejected because of the weight such remarks
may carry with the jury. 59 The Court also considered the weakness of
the evidence against the defendant, finding that if there had been over-
whelming evidence it may have resulted in a different conclusion by the
Court.60 The Court's analysis in this early decision focused on the persis-
tent nature of the prosecutor's improper remarks and stressed the preju-
dicial effect such repeated improper behavior would have on the jury.6 1
The Supreme Court continued to formulate the standard defining
improper prosecutorial behavior in 1945 when it decided Viereck v.
United States.6 2 In Viereck, a case taking place during an era of
heightened patriotism resulting from World War II, the prosecutor
likened the jury to the soldiers in the Bataan Peninsula.63 He analogized
the jury's duty to protect the American public from criminals to that of
the soldiers protecting world freedom from the Japanese. 64 The Su-
preme Court found these remarks prejudicial to the petitioner's right to
a fair trial. 65 The Court said that the remarks were irrelevant to the facts
or issues of the case and had the "purpose or effect of arousing passion
Q: I want you to tell me I am lying is that so?
Id. at 86-7.
55. Id. at 88.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 84.
58. Id. at 89.
59. Id. at 88. The pertinent part of the record from the Berger trial is reproduced in the opinion
at pages 84 through 85.
60. Id. at 89.
61. See id.
62. 318 U.S. 236 (1943).
63. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1943).
64. Id. at 247 n.3.
65. Id. at 247.
776 [VOL.. 73:771
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and prejudice." 66 This decision altered the standard of prosecutorial
impropriety established in Berger by shifting the focus to the intended
effect of the remarks on the jury.67
In 1985 the Supreme Court again addressed the boundaries of
prosecutorial impropriety in Young v. United States.68 The Supreme
Court held that the prosecutor may not express "personal belief or
opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the
guilt of the defendant." 69 The holding of Young requires the prose-
cutor to prosecute to the fullest extent of his or her ability but present no
opinion as to his or her personal belief of the defendant's guilt.70
The Young decision also highlighted the ABA Standard for Crimi-
nal Justice guidelines defining improper prosecutorial conduct. 7 1 The
ABA's standard provided that the prosecutor may not misstate evidence;
mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw; express a personal
belief or opinion about testimony or a witness; or make arguments
calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury. 72 Addition-
ally, the standard prohibits arguments which would inject issues beyond
guilt or innocence into the jury's attention, as well as arguments that
would focus the jury's attention upon the consequences of its verdict
beyond the determination of guilt or innocence. 73 Violation of any of
the guidelines may cause the jury to become prejudiced and result in
reversible error.74
In addition to implementing the ABA standard in the Young
decision, the Court went on to explain that improper prosecutorial
66. Id. The remarks found prejudicial were quoted by the court, as follows:
In closing, let me remind you ladies and gentlemen that this is war. This is war,
harsh, cruel, murderous war. There are those who, right at this very moment, are
plotting your death and my death; plotting our death and the death of our families
because we have committed no other crime than that we do not agree with their ideas of
persecution and concentration camps.
This is war. It is a fight to the death. The American people are relying upon you,
ladies and gentlemen for their protection against this sort of crime, just as much as they
are relying upon the protection of the men who man the guns in Bataan Peninsula, and
everywhere else. They are relying upon you ladies and gentlemen for their protection.
We are at war. You have a duty to perform here.
Id. at 247-48 n.3.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1151 (6th Cir. 1991) (discussing Viereck
and explaining that the Sixth Circuit rule that appeals to the jury's community interests are not per se
impermissible, but that instead the prosecutor's intent to inflame or prejudice the jury must be
considered).
68. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
69. Young, 470 U.S. at 7 n.3 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.4(e) (1984)).
70. Id. at 9.
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remarks alone do not justify a reversal. 75 Instead, the remarks must be
viewed within the context of the trial to determine whether the jury was
prejudiced. 76
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals faithfully followed the
Supreme Court's guidelines when it decided United States v. Splain.77
The court in Splain found that the prosecutor must prosecute both
vigorously and fairly, and may not express partisan or personal positions
because such expressions are not evidence and may prejudice the jury.78
The court concluded that referring to defendant Splain and his
testimonies as "slick" was improper prosecutorial conduct. 79 The court
also embraced the position that the courts had yet to adopt a per se rule
requiring reversal of a conviction where prosecutorial impropriety has
occurred. 80
In Splain, the court viewed the prosecutor's referral to the
defendant as "slick" in the light most favorable to the government,
reasoning that "slick" does not necessarily have an inherently criminal
or sinister connotation. 8 1 The court focused on the criminal intent impli-
cated by the characterization of the defendant. 82 In support of their
decision, the court cited several other circuit court cases where question-
able words were used to characterize defendants but no reversible error
was committed.8 3 The characterizations followed a trend: if a plausible
75. See id. at 11.
76. See id. A line of cases has also developed focusing on prosecutors using their closing argu-
ment to respond to improper remarks by the defense attorney. This doctrine, referred to as "invited
response," has achieved some acceptance by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 242 (1940) (finding that within the context of the trial, both the
defense counsel's conduct and the prosecutor's conduct are relevant to determine whether the prose-
cutor's behavior amounted to prejudicial error). The Court in Young generally accepted that some-
times improper prosecutorial remarks could act as a balancing mechanism to off-set improper remarks
by the defense attorney, finding that such balancing may prevent the jury from being led astray.
Young, 470 U.S. at 12.
77. 545 F.2d 1131 (8th Cir. 1976).
78. United States v. Splain, 545 F.2d 1131, 1134 (8th Cir. 1976).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1135. This idea was adopted from WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2084
(1957). Id. at 1134; see also United States v. Green, 497 F.2d 1068, 1085 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that
the facts of each case must be independently reviewed to determine whether the comment prejudiced
the jury); United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1207 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that reversal is only
justified if the jury verdict could reasonably have been affected by the improper argument).
81. Splain, 545 F.2d at 1134.
82. See id. The Eighth Circuit found that although "slick" has a negative connotation, it does not
necessarily have a criminal one. Id.
83. Id.; see also United States v. Cook, 432 F.2d 1093, 1106 (7th Cir. 1970) (calling defendant a
"true monster" and a "subhuman man" with a "rancid, rotten mind" was improper but not prejudicial);
United States v. Hoffman, 415 F.2d 14, 21 (7th Cir. 1969) (characterizing the defendant with words
such as "liar, crook, wheeler and dealer and similar terms" was not reversible error). But note, while
the prosecutor's comments towards the defendant in Splain were clearly improper, the conviction was
upheld because the defendant's substantive trial rights were not infringed upon. See Splain, 545 F.2d.
at 1135-36 (holding that the evidence against defendant Splan was strong enough to preclude a
778 [VOL. 73:771
1997] CASE COMMENT
definition of the questionable word(s) did not imply criminal activity,
and substantial evidence supported the defendant's guilt, the descriptive
reference probably did not constitute reversible error.84
Eight years after the Splain decision, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals again had the opportunity to address prosecutorial misconduct
in United States v. Johnson.85 The Johnson court's decision defined the
difference between proper and improper remarks by the relevance of the
remark to the evidence. 86 The court held that the prosecutor may not
appeal to the jurors' sense of morality or localism. 87 Remarks referring
to such emotions were found to be improper.88
Other circuits have defined prosecutorial misconduct in different
ways. One relevant decision is from the Sixth Circuit's 1991 decision,
United States v. Solivan.89 While the language from this decision has
not been expressly adopted by the Eighth Circuit, it provides a workable
framework for analysis. The Solivan court explained that appealing to a
national or local community interest of the juror is not per se mis-
conduct. 90 Instead, the context of the remark must be appraised and the
correlation between the community interest appealed to and the likeli-
hood the remark will inflame or prejudice the jury must be considered.9 1
The Solivan court emphasized that appeals to the jury to act as the
community conscience are not impermissible per se.92 Only when the
remarks are used for the purpose of arousing the jury's passion and
prejudice do they become improper. 93 The court must consider the
nature of the community interest being appealed to, and the context of
finding of prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's improper remarks).
84. See Splain, 545 F.2d at 1134 n.l (referring to Hall v. United States, 419 F.2d 582, 587 (5th
Cir. 1969), where the defendant's conviction was reversed because the prosecutor called him a
"hoodlum" in closing argument, and the word "hoodlum" implies that one has engaged in previous
illicit conduct).
85. 968 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1992).
86. United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768, 771-72 (8th Cir. 1992). The language adopted by the
Eighth Circuit attempts to clarify improper prosecutorial behavior and is as follows:
A prosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order to protect
community values, preserve civil order, or deter future lawbreaking. The evil lurking in
such prosecutorial appeals is that the defendant will be convicted for reasons wholly
irrelevant to his own guilt or innocence. Jurors may be persuaded by such appeals to
believe that, by convicting a defendant, they will assist in the solution of some pressing
social problem. The amelioration of society's woes is far too heavy a burden for the
individual criminal defendant to bear.
Id. (citing United States v. Hawkins, 595 F.2d 751, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1152 (6th Cir. 1991). The court found that
the prosecutor may not urge the jury to "tell [the defendant] and all of the other drug dealers like her
that we don't want that stuff in Northern Kentucky." Id. at 1148. Such comments were found to
arouse feelings of localism in the jury about their part in the war on drugs. Id. at 1152.
88. Id.
89. 937 F.2d 1146 (1991).
90. United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1151 (6th Cir. 1991).
91. Id. at 1152.
92. Id. at 1151.
93. Id.
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the appeal. 94 In this framework, the court can determine whether the
remark is meant solely to inflame the jury, or whether it is an uninten-
tional appeal. 95 A prosecutor is not allowed to urge conviction to
"protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future law-
breaking." 96 To allow such remarks would condone convictions based
upon emotional appeal, not evidence. 97 The defendant cannot be con-
victed because the jury believes it will be assisting in the solution of a
social problem.9 8 The conviction must rest on the weight of the evi-
dence. 99 Furthermore, the prosecutor should be especially wary of
comments which may appeal to community interests when the case deals
with a particular social problem. 00
Again, the Eighth Circuit has not formally adopted this framework.
It is included in this case comment because it appears to be the same
analytical process utilized by the Eighth Circuit when considering
whether the prosecutor's remarks are intended to inflame the jury or
appeal to a community interest.
Because of the fact specific nature of a prosecutor's conduct, the
impropriety of his or her remarks must be decided on a case-by-case
basis.'O' The Eighth Circuit has followed the standards enunciated by
the Supreme Court, which give the circuit courts plenty of latitude to
define prosecutorial impropriety within each jurisdiction, and has in-
creasingly expanded its own definition of what constitutes improper
prosecutorial conduct.102 When looking at the prior decisions of both
the United States Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, as well as relevant decisions from the other circuits, it becomes
obvious that determining the impropriety of a prosecutor's remarks dur-
ing closing argument is not an exact science.
The judicial response to the problem has been to create a laundry
list of improper remarks.1 03 The prosecutor may refer to any properly
94. Id. at 1152.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Barlin, 686 F.2d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding that the prosecutor's
remarks were designed to divert the jury from the evidence).




99. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (finding that the jury's attention may not
be directed to facts which are not in evidence and may be prejudicial).
100. See Solivan, 937 F.2d at 1154.
101. See United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768,770 (8th Cir. 1992).
102. See, e.g., Mack v. Caspari, 92 F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant must
preserve his right to appeal by timely objection to the prosecutor's improper comments or that right is
waived); Johnson, 968 F.2d at 771 (finding that a single instance of prosecutorial misconduct can
require the reversal of a conviction).




admitted facts, including the probative value of the evidence, the credi-
bility of any witnesses, and the application of law, 104 as well as reasonable
inferences which can be drawn from the facts. 105 A prosecutor may not
include misstated testimony; interpretations of the law; facts or evidence
not already in the record (unless it is a common fact); personal beliefs or
opinions as to the weight of the evidence; and, perhaps most importantly,
statements to inflame or prejudice the jury.l0 6
B. PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF IMPROPER PROSECUTORIAL CLOSING
REMARKS
The Eighth Circuit prosecutorial misconduct test requires that two
separate, but related, issues be examined. 107 First, it must be determined
whether the prosecutor's remarks during the closing argument were
improper, as discussed above. 108 Second, if impropriety is found, then
the reviewing court must decide whether the impropriety prejudicially
affected the substantive trial rights of the defendant.109 To aid in its
evaluation, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has established three
criteria to evaluate the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's improper
remarks: (1) the cumulative effect of such misconduct; (2) the strength
of the properly admitted evidence of the defendant's guilt; and (3) the
curative actions taken by the trial court.110
Though the Eight Circuit has utilized a three part test to determine
whether the substantive trial rights of the defendant have been violated,
the United States Supreme Court has yet to expressly define criteria to
consider when evaluating the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's
remarks. The Supreme Court has been reluctant to create a per se
reversal standard and has instead mandated a case-by-case examination
in deciding whether the jury has been prejudicially affected by the
improper remarks of the prosecutor."'l In accord with this standard, the
Court has considered the weight of the evidence and the remarks in the
context of the trial when determining whether the improper remarks
warranted a new trial. 112
104. Id.
105. See United States v. Boyce, 797 F.2d 691, 694 (8th Cir 1996).
106. See Nidiry, supra note 103, at 1311.
107. See United States v. Hernandez, 779 F.2d 456, 458 (8th Cir. 1985).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 460-61.
111. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (finding that the court must determine whether
the improper conduct resulted in prejudice to the jury on a case-by-case basis).
112. See Young, 470 U.S. at 15 (finding the prosecutor's remarks must be examined within the
context of the trial to determine whether they prejudicially affected the jury); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 15, 239 (1940) (holding that the prosecutor calling the defendant
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In short, the determination of prejudicial effect upon the jury from
improper prosecutorial remarks is up to the trial court, which is given
much discretion. 113 The court of appeals may only reverse the lower
court decision if there is a showing of clear abuse of discretion.11 4 The
reasoning behind this required showing is that the trial judge is better
able than an appellate court to determine the prejudicial effect of the
prosecutor's remarks upon the jury.115
III. ANALYSIS
In United States v. Cannon,116 the defendants claimed that the Assis-
tant United States Attorney's remarks during closing argument
constituted prosecutorial misconduct and improperly prejudiced the
jury.'17 In assessing this claim, the Eighth Circuit noted that only in
cases of clear abuse of discretion will the lower court's decision be
overturned. 118
The Eighth Circuit, following the Hernandez test, looked first at the
impropriety of the prosecutor's remarks in the context of the trial.' 19
The court found the prosecutor's remarks to be improper for several
reasons. 120 First, the reference to the defendants as "bad people" did
not further the aims of justice or aid in the search for truth.121 Instead,
the remarks directed the jury's attention to the race and residency of the
defendants.1 22 Regardless of the alleged crimes committed by the
defendants, the court felt that the prosecutor crossed the line of propriety
by characterizing the defendants as bad people.123 Since the prosecutor
had a certain level of credibility because of his profession' 24 and his
"slick" was not prejudicial because the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming).
113. United States v. Powell, 771 F.2d 1173, 1175 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that the trial judge has
broad discretion in determining whether the prosecutor's improper remarks prejudiced the jury's
verdict).
114. See United States v. Greene, 497 F.2d 1068, 1085 (7th Cir. 1974) (finding clear abuse existed
because the prosecutor's remarks were "unduly prejudicial"); Mellor v. United States, 160 F.2d 757,
765 (8th Cir. 1947) (holding that clear abuse is found when a prosecutor's remarks are "plainly
unwarranted and clearly injurious").
115. United States v. McBride, 862 F.2d 1316, 1320 (8th Cir. 1988). This is because the
reviewing court would most likely be working from a cold record. Id.
116. 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996).
117. United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1502 (8th Cir. 1996).
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing United States v. Hernandez, 779 F.2d 456, 460 (8th Cir. 1985)).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The Eighth Circuit referred to the prosecutor's comments as a "thinly veiled appeal to
parochial allegiances." Id. However, the government disputes this allegation in its brief petitioning
for a rehearing, arguing that the "statements by the Assistant United States Attorney have been grossly
misinterpreted, improperly characterized and not properly evaluated in the context of the entire
record." Pet. Reh'g at 9, Cannon (No. 95-1997).
123. Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1502.
124. See United States v. Berger, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (referring to the two-fold duty of the
prosecutor to both further justice and aid in the search for truth).
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closing argument closely preceded the jury's deliberation, the court
determined that the remarks were designed to elicit a feeling of localism
in the jury. 125 In fact, the court found that the words of the prosecutor
gave the jury a "hook to hang their verdict upon" which was irrelevant
to the evidence admitted for determining guilt or innocence. 126
In addition, the timing of the remarks was particularly pertinent in
the court's evaluation.127 The remarks occurred during rebuttal of the
closing argument. 128 The only option available to the defense attorney
was an objection, subsequently denied by the trial judge.129 The trial
judge stated that the closing arguments could be argumentative and that
the prosecutor was not out of line. 130 The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed with the trial judge's perception of the remarks. 131
The court of appeals thought that the insinuation behind the remark, as
well as the timing, was particularly damaging, although the impropriety
occurred only twice. 132
After finding the prosecutor's remarks to be improper, the Cannon
court next considered whether the comments prejudicially affected the
jury and, as a result, denied the defendants a fair trial. 133 In reaching an
affirmative answer to this question, the court's analysis began by
evaluating the cumulative effect of the misconduct. 134 The remarks
occurred close to the end of the trial, and characterized the defendants in
a way that was most likely to remain in the jury members' minds during
deliberation.135 Furthermore, the content of the words could arouse a
feeling of protection towards North Dakota in general, or Fargo in
particular, both of which have relatively few drug dealers.136 After
considering these factors and the context of the remarks, the court
decided that the cumulative effect of the improper remarks was
significant even though the impropriety was limited to two remarks.137
125. Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1502.
126. Id. at 1503.
127. Id. (stating that since the remarks came during rebuttal arguments, the defense was unable
to respond except by objecting to the statements).
128. Id. at 1502.
129. Id. at 1503.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. The Eighth Circuit perceived the prosecutor's remarks as a "thinly veiled appeal to
parochial allegiances." Id. at 1502.
133. Id.
134. United States v. Hernandez, 779 F.2d 456, 458 (8th Cir. 1985).
135. Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1502.
136. Id. at 1503.
137. Id.
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The court then proceeded to evaluate the strength of the properly
admitted evidence, the second criterion of the Hernandez test. 138 The
court found that the evidence concerning the drug and handgun charges
was overwhelming. 139 The evidence concerning the defendants' predis-
position to buy a machine gun, however, was more questionable.140 The
court believed a reasonable jury, without the bias caused by the improper
references to the defendants, may have found that the defendants were
not predisposed to buy a machine gun, therefore the evidence did not
meet the strength requirement of the Hernandez test. 141
Finally, the lack of curative instructions by the trial court judge was
considered by the court. 142 Under the Hernandez criteria, misconduct
can be cured by an instruction to the jury to ignore the improper
remarks.143 In this case, no curative instruction was given. In fact, the
trial court judge overruled the objection to the prosecutor's remarks and
indicated that closing arguments can be argumentative.44
The weakness of the evidence of the defendants' predisposition to
buy a machine gun, coupled with the lack of a curative instruction,
resulted in the Cannon court finding reversible error.145 The court
found the improper nature of the prosecutor's remarks made it easy for
the jury to separate themselves from the Cannons by characterizing them
as foreigners. 146 It opened the door to a decision based upon personal
feeling instead of properly admitted evidence. 147
After finding improper prosecutorial remarks and a violation of the
Defendants' substantive trial rights, the court held that the Defendants
were entitled to a new trial on all counts.148
IV. IMPACT
The Eighth Circuit's decision in holding the prosecutor's character-
ization of the defendants as "bad people" to be improper and preju-
dicial may alter how prosecutors argue within the Eighth Circuit. While
it is unknown whether the decision will influence other circuits, the
precedent has been set for prosecutors in the Eighth Circuit.
138. Id. at 1502 (citing Hernandez, 779 F.2d at 458).




143. Id. (using the criteria set out in Hernandez, 779 F.2d at 458).
144. Id. at 1502-03.






First of all, the Eighth Circuit is sending a message to prosecutors.
This decision is a definite constriction upon the latitude available to
prosecutors during their closing argument. Instead of reversing and
remanding only the counts dealing with the questionable evidence of
predisposition to buy a machine gun, the court remanded the entire
case. 14
9
While it has long been accepted that the prosecutor may not
blatantly appeal to the emotions of the jury, the court has now rejected
even unintentional appeals to the jury members' emotions. 150 In effect,
this seems to be a harsh message to prosecutors practicing within the
Eighth Circuit not to overstep the established boundaries. Arguments
appealing to the jurors' local or community interests are not acceptable,
even if the reference is unintentional. Overzealous, or even moderately
zealous, prosecutors will certainly need to rethink their strategy before
arguing in the jurisdiction of the Eighth Circuit.
This decision also demonstrates the court's tightening of its
authority over the district court. In finding that the trial court erred, the
court of appeals is showing that its window of propriety is much nar-
rower than that of the district court's. This reversal may result in a trial
bench that listens to arguments with a more critical ear. It could be that
the first hint of impropriety, including an unintentional appeal to juror
emotion, may soon become grounds upon which to reprimand the
prosecutor. Similarly, it may also result in a bench that pays particular
attention to potentially argumentative statements by prosecutors.
Although this decision could have harsh repercussions, it will
depend upon the enforcement of the new, stricter standard by the Eighth
Circuit itself. In a case decided after Cannon, the Eighth Circuit found a
prosecutor's remarks improper but not prejudicial. 151 The court's deci-
sion in that case hinged upon the failure of defense counsel to object to
the improper remark, and therefore, preserve the grounds for appeal. 152
In light of that decision, perhaps the Eighth Circuit's decision in Cannon
will not be as far reaching. Only the Eighth Circuit itself can define the
impact of its holding in the Cannon case, deciding for itself if "bad" is
always bad, and how "bad" is too bad.
Jennifer Lessinger
149. Id.
150. See id. at 1502.
151. Mack v. Caspari, 92 F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that the prosecutor calling the
defendant a "killer" during a trial for assault, robbery, and armed criminal action, was improper but
not prejudicial).
152. Id. at 643.
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